Short, up-to-date summary of the fact-finding and investigation into the Air India Boeing 787 crash (AI171, Ahmedabad — 12 Jun 2025):
What investigators have already found (key facts)
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB-India) published a preliminary report in July 2025. It shows that both engines lost thrust a few seconds after liftoff when the engine fuel-control switches moved from RUN to CUTOFF. Investigators recorded the switch movements as happening within about 1 second of each other. Il Sole 24 Ore+1
The ram air turbine (RAT) deployed automatically a few seconds after the first switch moved, indicating a near-instant loss of normal electrical/hydraulic power. Il Sole 24 Ore
Cockpit voice recordings contain a fragment in which one pilot asks the other why he “cut off” (or “cut it off”) and the other replies “I did not.” The AAIB reported the exchange but has not attributed responsibility or concluded that one pilot intentionally moved the switches. Investigators warn against premature conclusions. Reuters+1
Physical evidence shows an apparent inconsistency: the throttle levers were recovered in the idle position, but flight-data indicates thrust was at takeoff power until impact. The AAIB has not identified a mechanical fault that explains the switch movement. Il Sole 24 Ore
Actions already taken
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) ordered enhanced inspections of Air India’s 787 fleet and later mandated checks across operators on certain fuel-switch locking/related systems. Air India carried out precautionary inspections of fuel-control switch mechanisms on its 787/737 fleet and reported no issues found in those checks. Financial Times+1
International agencies (UK AAIB, FAA and other partners) have been notified and technical assistance/liaison is in progress; the AAIB of India is leading the formal investigation. GOV.UK+1
What remains unknown / open questions
Why the fuel-control switches moved from RUN to CUTOFF remains unresolved. Possibilities under examination include inadvertent mechanical/flaw action, maintenance/installation issues, design vulnerability of the switch/lock, or an intentional manual action — but investigators have not concluded any of these. Il Sole 24 Ore+1
The mismatches between recovered cockpit hardware positions and flight-data recorder traces require detailed forensics (e.g., component lab testing, wiring/actuator examinations, CVR/FDR correlation). Il Sole 24 Ore
Probable next steps in the investigation
Forensic examination of the recovered components (switches, throttle modules, wiring, actuators).
Deep analysis of maintenance records and recent work on the aircraft and engines.
Human-factors review of the cockpit sequence and procedures, plus simulator re-enactments if required.
AAIB will prepare a final report; per ICAO guidance the final report is normally issued as soon as possible and—if feasible—within 12 months of the accident (interim statements if final takes longer). ICAO+1
Practical implications so far
Regulators worldwide have been alerting operators to check fuel-control/fuel-switch mechanisms and related systems; carriers have been conducting targeted inspections. Boeing and GE have so far said no immediate design/airworthiness directive was required based on preliminary findings. Reuters+1
📄 1. Annotated Highlights from the AAIB Preliminary Report + Media Insights
This BBC summary sets the stage—here are the key technical takeaways and context:
Topic
Key Points
Switch Movement
Both fuel-control switches moved from “RUN” to “CUTOFF” almost simultaneously (within about one second) just after takeoff, shutting off fuel supply to both engines.ICAO+3The Guardian+3AP News+3
Pilot Fragment in CVR
One pilot asks “why did you cut off?” and the other replies “I did not.” No determination yet of who said what, or if it was intentional.India Today+2The Guardian+2
RAT Deployment & Hardware Mismatch
The ram air turbine deployed automatically, indicating near-instant electrical/hydraulic failure. Thrust levers were physically found in “idle” despite flight data showing takeoff thrust until impact.The Guardian+2mint+2
Context: Prior Advisory
There was a 2018 FAA advisory (SAIB) for Boeing 737/787 fuel control switch locking mechanisms. It was non-mandatory then.The Guardian+1
🔧 2. Current Actions, Regulatory Response & Timeline
Aspect
Status / Impact
DGCA Mandate & Inspections
On July 14, DGCA ordered all Boeing 787/737 operators in India to complete inspection of fuel-control switch locking mechanisms by July 21. Air India began voluntary checks on July 12.AP News+3India Today+3Business Today+3
Findings of Inspections
Air India completed inspections across 787 and 737 fleet—no defects found in locking mechanisms. They also had compliance with maintenance schedules and prior component replacements.Reuters+3Business Today+3India Today+3
Investigation Progress
• Black box (FDR & CVR) data recovered; this includes first time analysis of black-box data done domestically by AAIB lab in Delhi.The Times of India+1 • Wreckage secured. Components of interest being forensically examined (wiring, switch mechanism).The Guardian+1
Regulatory & Industry Position
FAA/Boeing privately maintain that current switch design is safe. Pilot associations dispute speculative narratives about intentional action. DGCA & other regulators are leaning toward more inspections rather than immediate design overhaul.AP News+2The Guardian+2
🕐 3. Expected Timeline & What to Watch For
Final Report: Under ICAO Annex 13 rules, the AAIB-India should release a final report as soon as possible, and ideally within 12 months from the date of accident. If not, an interim statement is required each anniversary.ICAO+2ICAO+2
Interim Findings: Look for safety recommendations or design/maintenance advisories even before the final report — especially relating to switch systems, cockpit human factors, and potential mechanical vulnerabilities.
Regulatory Reaction: Boeing, FAA, DGCA may consider airworthiness directives (ADs) if investigations identify actionable risks.
Industry Response: More airlines may begin voluntary inspection of similar systems globally, especially in regions without past mandates.
บันทึกเสียงในห้องนักบินมีการสนทนา: นักบินถามว่า “why did you cut off?” อีกฝ่ายตอบ “I did not.” แต่ยังไม่มีการระบุว่าใครพูด และยังไม่สรุปว่าเป็นการตั้งใจหรือไม่
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