This is one of the most common misconceptions — many people think that an airplane must always have engine power to stay in the air. In fact, that’s not true at all. Every aircraft is designed to glide efficiently even without thrust from its engines.
A commercial jet can glide for dozens of miles per 10,000 feet of altitude. For example, from 30,000 feet, a plane can glide over 100 kilometers! Pilots are trained to handle such “engine-out” situations by maintaining the correct glide ratio and choosing a safe landing site — whether it’s an airport or an open field.
กรณีที่มีชื่อเสียง เช่น “Miracle on the Hudson” ปี 2009 เมื่อเครื่องบิน Airbus A320 ของ US Airways ถูกนกชนเครื่องยนต์ทั้งสองข้างดับ แต่นักบินสามารถร่อนลงกลางแม่น้ำได้อย่างปลอดภัย ถือเป็นตัวอย่างจริงที่พิสูจน์ว่า “เครื่องยนต์ดับ ไม่ได้แปลว่าเครื่องตก” ครับ
One famous case is the “Miracle on the Hudson” in 2009, when a US Airways A320 lost both engines after a bird strike. The pilots glided and landed safely on the Hudson River — proving that engine failure doesn’t mean disaster.
Case Study: TransAsia Airways Flight 235 (4 Feb 2015)
5
1. Overview of the Event
On 4 February 2015, flight GE 235 of TransAsia Airways — an ATR 72-600 (registration B-22816) — departed from Taipei Songshan Airport (TSA) en route to Kinmen Airport. Wikipedia+2Taipei Times+2
There were 58 people on board (53 passengers + 5 crew). Wikipedia+1
Shortly after take-off the aircraft suffered a loss of thrust in one engine, and in the pilot’s response the other (still operating) engine was shut down. The aircraft then banked sharply, clipped a highway viaduct and crashed into the Keelung River. Wikipedia
The final official investigation found 43 fatalities onboard and serious safety failings in crew response. TTAA+1
2. Technical Sequence & Failures
At ~36 seconds after take-off the #2 engine (right side) entered an unintended “auto-feather” state (i.e., the propeller was feathered automatically) due to a fault in the autofeather unit (AFU) and/or torque sensing. TTAA+1
About 46 seconds later, the crew shut down the #1 engine (left side) — the still-operating engine — apparently in attempt to diagnose or fix the malfunction. This left the aircraft without thrust. CBS News+1
As a result, the aircraft lost altitude, the stall warning systems activated (stick shaker/stick pusher) and the crew did not manage to recover; the aircraft clipped the viaduct (damaging the wing) and crashed into the river. TTAA+1
3. Causes & Contributing Factors
Mechanical/engineering factor: The AFU of engine #2 had intermittent solder-joint discontinuities, which may have triggered the auto-feather sequence erroneously. AeroInside+1
Human/operator factor: The crew did not correctly identify which engine had failed, did not apply the documented ‘engine flameout at take-off’ procedures, and mistakenly shut down the healthy engine. International Business Times+1
Training & oversight factor: The captain had previously failed a simulator check for handling engine flame-out on take-off, yet still remained in command; the airline’s policies lacked clarity on rejecting take-off if the ATPCS (automatic take-off power control system) was not armed. Taipei Times+1
Flight path/altitude margin: The incident happened during the initial climb, where altitude and time to react were very limited. The mismanagement of the situation rapidly reduced the flight safety margin.
4. Lessons for Piloting, Flight Ops & Training
For your book (with KSA: Knowledge, Skills, Attitudes) and also for CBTA, this case offers multiple excellent teaching points:
Knowledge: Understand autofeather systems, torque sensors, the logic of automatic systems (AFU/ATPCS), and the physics of twin-engine climb performance under failure.
Skills: Engine-failure identification, correct execution of abnormal/emergency procedures, crew resource management (CRM), correct use of checklists, maintaining aircraft control and performance after failure.
Attitudes: Vigilance, decisiveness, adherence to SOPs, resisting the urge to guess rather than follow procedure. Also the humility to refuse to proceed if automatic systems indication is abnormal (e.g., ATPCS not armed).
In the ops side (dispatcher/พนักงานอำนวยการบิน): recognising the critical phase of initial climb, being aware of airline training standards, monitoring automation system statuses, and ensuring that crew are suitably trained and airlines maintain robust failure mode oversight.
For your channel “Capt. Sopon Insights”: you could create a “What went wrong – timeline ticks by second” video/infographic: “From +0 to +72 s after take-off”, with cockpit-voice quotes such as: “Oh, no, wrong throttle [was pulled back]” Taipei Times This makes the incident relatable and draws in lay-audience interest while retaining technical depth.
5. References (for deeper study)
Full investigation report (English summary) via Taiwan’s Aviation Safety Council: ASC-AOR-16-06-001 (pdf) TTAA
Wikipedia summary: TransAsia Airways Flight 235 Wikipedia
Media coverage: “Engine failure and crew errors caused deadly Taipei crash” by The National The National
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